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ABSTRACT 
 
In terms of both population and territory, Indonesia and China are the largest nations in their respective 
regions of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. They share a long history of relations, with a 'golden age' 
of understanding dating back to the 7th century. This was when learned Buddhists from China would 
travel via Borobodur in Java in their pilgrimages to India. Later, from the 14th century, diplomatic and 
trade interactions were fostered by 'cultural brokers' on both sides. Chronicles show Javanese envoys of 
Chinese origin, such as Chen Yen-xiang, conducting diplomacy with China. Muslim Chinese, such as 
the celebrated Ming Admiral Zheng He, enhanced China's diplomatic presence in the Archipelago in 
the 15th century. On occasion, relations became conflictual. China under the Mongols attacked Java in 
1293, but ultimately lost to an ambitious and manipulative Javanese, Raden Vijaya. More recently, 
Marxist-inspired China found common anti-imperialist cause with independent Indonesia. Yet this axis 
of understanding also served the machinations of Javanese politics and the rise to power of a Javanese 
general, Suharto. Ironically, China - not Indonesia - is celebrated as a strategic culture of deception, a 
view popularised by the writings attributed to the classical military strategist, Sun Tzu or Master Sun. 
Yet in early Sino-Javanese relations China's Mongol phase of military aggression was countered by a 
Javanese master of deception. As to General Suharto eight centuries later, his anti-Communist (and 
hence anti-China) cause lent legitimacy to a regime of reward and punishment. It was one which 
mirrored both its authoritarian opponent in Peking, as well as China's legalists and militarists of an 
earlier age. While culturally different, Indonesia and China appear to have more in common than meets 
popular perception. They are large multi-ethnic nations attempting to maintain their unity in the face of 
centrifugal forces. Globalisation in the present era has also made regional relations even more 
imperative for maintaining national strength. Internal stability appears to be best served by regional 
integration on the basis of common cultural, commercial and national interests. It is also more ably 
expressed in an ethic of respect that prevailed in past periods, not only between nations but also 
between peoples. Thus the dharma of the present diplomatic age would require an internal respect for 
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difference within the national entity. Sino-Indonesians are a case in point. Unless internal divisions are 
healed, or at least better managed, external relations are unlikely to escape the manipulative forces of 
domestic politics. In an age which has seen the rise of militant Islam, and along with it, an increasingly 
imperialistic USA, the two largest polities in eastern Asia would do well to heed their history. 
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A Strategic Overview 
 
In terms of both population and territory, Indonesia and China are the largest nations 
in their respective regions of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. With a population of 
214 million, 90 percent of whom are Muslim, Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim 
nation. Its territory of 1.8 million square kilometres extends some 5,000 kilometres 
from east to west, from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and incorporates 13,677 
islands. This makes Indonesia the world's largest archipelago. In terms of natural 
resources, Indonesia has large natural gas reserves, it is Asia's biggest oil exporter, 
and some of the world's largest mining operations are to be found in Indonesia 
(McCawley 2003: 51). It controls or shares control of strategic shipping routes - the 
Sunda and Melaka straits. More than 40 percent the world's shipping passes through 
the Melaka Strait (Snow 2003: 157). 
 
In China's case its population of 1.28 billion renders it the most populous nation on 
earth, while at over 9.56 million square kilometres it is the third largest country after 
Russia and Canada. Its 2.25 million troops form not only the region's, but the world's, 
largest armed force. China's reputation as a major military power is crowned by the 
possession of nuclear weapons that are capable of all ranges and delivery modes (for 
details, see IISS 2003: 152-155). Economically, it is the world's fourth largest trading 
nation, and has earned the reputation of 'workshop' of the world. China, the oldest 
continuous civilisation of some 5,000 years, is also the world's fastest developing 
economy in the present age.  
 
The enormous material and human potential of these two giants of eastern Asia is 
accompanied by potential instability in their natural and political environments. 
Indonesia's forest degradation and China's creeping desertification are only two of the 
more obvious physical losses suffered by these countries. Politically they are both 
centralised republics that fear fragmentation. As multi-ethnic polities, they incorporate 
difference on condition that it is an attribute of, and not a challenge to, state unity. The 
long-held Indonesian motto of 'unity in diversity' implies the existence of another 
possibility, that of 'disunity in diversity' - particularly under current conditions of 
democractic freedoms. This is not as yet a problem for the Chinese state.  China lacks 
Indonesia's democracy, just as Indonesia lacks China's cohesion. There is an 
underlying fragility to their enormity. The uncertainties of a regional future influenced 
by the actions of Indonesian and China are the concern of this paper, but not its 
investigative arena. Rather, it is their past relations with each other that provide the 
setting within which lessons for the future may be drawn.  
 
 
I Sino-Indonesian Contact in a Buddhist Age: The Wheel of 
Dharma Sets in Motion 
 
Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE) historical records indicate China made maritime 
contact with the 'Nanyang' or 'Southern Ocean' (meaning Southeast Asia) some 2000 
years ago. This marked also the start of the Christian era in Europe and the spread of 
Buddhism from India to China and other parts of Asia. Sino-Indonesian relations were 
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thus conceived in a new age of Buddhist international relations whose source went 
back six centuries to the teachings of the Buddha in northern India. 
 
The Founding of Buddhism in India, 6th Century BCE 
 
Founded in the 6th century BCE by the Sakyamuni ('Sage of the Sakyas'), a prince in 
the state of Magadha on the present-day India-Nepalese border, Buddhism grew out of 
Hinduism, but discarded its ascetic extremities in favour of a doctrine of the Middle 
Way. Not only did it avoid the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification, but 
Buddhism abandoned the caste system, replacing it with a teaching of compassion for 
all living beings and the equality of human beings. Like Hinduism, however, 
Buddhism taught the illusory nature of the sensory world and warned of entrapment 
into that world. This was expressed through the Four Noble Truths. Simply expressed, these 
hold that "worldly existence is a form of suffering, that the causes of suffering can be 
determined, that therefore suffering can be eliminated, and that, finally, there is a Path 
leading to that end" (De Casparis and Mabbett 1992: 317; see also Ruhala 1978 for 
elaboration and source materials).  
 
Sakyamuni became the Buddha (the 'Enlightened One' or 'Awakened One') by 
meditating on this problem of suffering in the world. When he understood, and 
became 'awakened', he taught others how to achieve this also. His first sermon was at 
the Deer Park at Sarnath, near Varanasi. This sermon was called 'Setting into Motion 
the Wheel of Dharma' (Ruhala 1978: 92). Buddhism spread throughout India under 
Emperor Asoka's patronage in the 3rd century BCE, and over time was propagated by 
other sympathetic rulers, missionaries, merchants, and travellers to South, Southeast, 
East and Central Asia, including the old Greek kingdoms of Alexander to the 
Northwest.  
 
Buddhism became the dominant spiritual philosophy of the Chinese from the mid-4th 
to the 8th centuries - that is, during the Six Dynasties period (222 - 581), the Sui (581-
618) and the early Tang (618-906 CE) dynasties. In Java, its high point came during 
the Sailendra dynasty (c.750-850) and the Singhasari-Majapahit period (especially 
c.1250-1400) (De Casparis and Mabbett 1992: 318).  
 
The Spread of Buddhism to China, 1st Century CE, and its Sinicisation 
 
China had become a powerful sponsor of Buddhism and second only to India as a 
Buddhist centre of teachings. China had not only received Buddhism into its culture 
as early as the first century CE, but sinicised it (that is, gave it Chinese 
characteristics). This was necessary in view of the 'this-worldly' orientation of 
Confucian China, compared to the 'other-wordly' disposition of Indian religious 
thought. The Chinese, typically being attached to family and wealth creation, at first 
found the Buddhist teaching of non-attachment difficult to follow. Yet they did find a 
place for it in their culture for it 'balanced' the preoccupations of the other two key 
spiritual traditions of China. In terms of their leanings, Confucianism tends to the 
ethical and the political, with a strong humanistic element; Daoism to the artistic and 
pragmatic with a sense of spontaneity; and Buddhism to the introspective and 
'religious', with a tolerant outlook. None of these three traditions recognised a God of 
the Judeo-Christian type. They are better described as spiritual philosophies. 
Rosita Dellios  Sino-Indonesian Relations: Lessons from the Past 
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Buddhism's interaction with Daoism gave rise to Chan Buddhism ('Zen' in Japanese). 
In this way Buddhism found an indigenous expression in China. 
 
From the 2nd century, China contributed to Buddhism's international age by opening 
to the outside world. It had embarked at circa 100 CE on a concert-of-power 
arrangement across Central Asia with the powerful Buddhist Kushan (Kusana) 
kingdom, primarily in order to protect trade along the Silk Road (Aron 1999; see also 
Cotterell 1993: 260). Aron (1999) observes that trade flourished across Rome, Persia, 
Kushan and China in this period of peace spanning "approximately 90 A.D to at least 
166 A.D - the year in which Antonius Pius sent an envoy to China".  
 
By the first century BCE, the oral tradition of Buddhism became a written one and 
developed into the Buddhist canon, Tripitaka. Buddhism facilitated 
internationalisation in that, unlike Christianity, it was a top-down rather than bottom-
up social phenomenon, having been adopted by the ruling classes and wealthy 
merchants first and the common people later (Reischauer and Fairbank 1970: 147). 
With a common Buddhist orientation, regionalism developed among the trading 
nations of Asia. 
 
The Period of the Pilgrimages, 5th - 8th centuries CE 
 
Buddhism had become sufficiently incorporated into Chinese culture that its prestige 
was linked to that of the Chinese state. 'Lai hua', meaning 'come and be transformed', 
was the promise of a higher culture and consciousness for those who came to pay 
tribute at the Chinese capital. In the 8th century this was the Tang capital of Changan, 
on the site of modern-day Xi’an. It was one of the great cosmopolitan cities in the 
world - like Baghdad and Constantinople - and the terminus of the Silk Road. This 
first international age of China celebrated difference and even elevated to the heights 
of its artistic accomplishments 'foreigners' such as the poet Li Bai (Li Po), who was 
born in Central Asia. So intermingled had the Chinese aristocracy become in the 
previous centuries - through diplomatic intermarriage and usurpations of the imperial 
throne among rival states that "the distinction between the various 'barbarian' groups 
and the Chinese in North China had become highly theoretical" (Reischauer and 
Fairbank 1970: 153). 
 
With the Chinese having absorbed Buddhism as their main religion, and it having 
gained imperial patronage, this 'foreign' spiritual philosophy flowed out again as a 
common bond abroad. This was the period when the celebrated monk Xuan Zhuang 
(Hsuan Tsang), one of some 200,1 went to India to bring back Buddhist texts. 
Southeast Asia, too, was part of the Buddhist networked world that prevailed during 
the age of pilgrimages. The desire on the part of Chinese monks "to refresh and purify 
their scriptural tradition" (De Casparis and Mabbett 1992: 292) through travel 
provided a chronicle of places visited and cultures experienced. The first such account 
of a traveller visiting archipelagic Southeast Asia came at the beginning of the 5th 
century, when the Chinese monk Fa Xian (Fa Hsien) journeyed to India, via Central 
Asia, and then down through Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia in the sea voyage back to 
China. This he called A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms (Fa Hsien, 1986), now known 
as Travels of Fa Xian.2
                                                          
1 Reischauer and Fairbank (1970: 146) note that nine were actually Koreans. 
2  On the various translations, see Percell 1965: 13, footnote 15. 
 Fa Xian sailed to Sumatra or Java (it is not clear which of the 
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two), and stayed there some five months awaiting the Southeast monsoon to enable 
the sea voyage back to China (FitzGerald 1993: 6-8). In his description of the ship 
passengers and the apparent regularity of these voyages, it appears that Chinese 
merchants were familiar with the region (see ibid.; Wolters 1967: 139-59; Slamet-
Velsink 1995: 91; Hall 1981: 39; Hall 1992: 194).  Indeed, the all-sea route between 
Indian and China via the Straits of Melaka has been dated from 350 CE (Hall 1992: 
194).  
 
By the end of the 7th century, another famous Chinese pilgrim, I-Ching visited 
Palembang, the centre of the maritime empire of Srivijaya which was also on record 
as presenting tribute to the Chinese emperor. Palembang conducted a high volume of 
trade in Chinese, Middle Eastern, and Indian goods, as well as spices and scented 
woods from Maluku (the Spice Islands) and Sumatra (SarDesai 1994: 42). That which 
concerned I-Ching, however, was Palembang's attraction as a Buddhist centre of 
learning with over a thousand monks. I-Ching spent four years there translating 
Buddhist scriptures from Sanskrit to Chinese (Hall 1981: 48). Chinese pilgrims-cum-
scholars also often stopped at Borobodur close to Yogyakarta, in central Java, whether 
on the journey to or from India, or as a destination in its own right. Besides 
Borobodur, two other great Buddhist monuments in Central Java attracted prilgrims - 
the temple complexes of Candi Sewu at Prambanan and the nearby Candi Plaosan. 
 
Clearly this was a time of strong people-to-people and not only ruler-to-ruler 
diplomacy. The temper of the times recognised the legitimacy of the pursuit of 
spiritual treasures alongside material ones. Wealth accrued on both counts. Political 
patrons, too, gained at various levels (religious merit, commercial expansion, 
enhanced legitimacy, compatible alliances) from propagation of the system. What did 
the dharma of this era signify? 
 
Wang (1992: 12) describes the period of the pilgrimages as "a time when Chinese 
shared a way of life with some of the people of the Nanyang and when a stronger 
bond existed between them than was possible before or ever after." De Casparis and 
Mabbett (1992), too, note, "a cosmopolitan oecumene of Buddhist culture 
disseminated across Asia by travelling monks". Borthwick (1992: 33) also remarks 
upon this religiously networked regionalism: 
 
Perhaps no single cultural phenomenon has unified the entire Asian continent to the extent 
that Buddhism did in the fourth through the ninth centuries . . . , for even though it was to 
be supplanted in later centuries by the vicissitudes of political change and rival religious 
movements, it alone during this period was able to culturally unite much of Asia within 
the apolitical embrace of belief and discipline. 
 
Reischauer and Fairbank (1970: 147) state, "probably half the world's population were 
believers in the Indian religion [of Buddhism] at this time". They go on to say that 
(pp. 147-8): "It blanketed the whole of the Asian continent, except for Siberia and the 
Near East, giving to this vast area a degree of cultural unity that has never been 
matched since then." 
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II Sino-Javanese Relations During the Mongol Phase 
 
Regular voyaging of Chinese to Southeast Asia occurred during the Southern Song 
Dynasty (1127-1279) and increased in the late 13th century under the subsequent 
foreign rule of the Mongols (Reid 1996: 17). This increased interaction also included 
military intervention, an unusual development in China's traditional relations with the 
region. It is to be remembered, however, that under the Mongols' Yuan dynasty 
(1271-1368), China was led by a martial culture. Its emperor, Khubilai Khan, was the 
grandson of one of history's 'world-conquerors', Chinggis (Ghengis) Khan, who had 
created through wars of conquest an empire across the Eurasian expanse linking Asia, 
the Middle East and Europe up to the Danube. It was the largest the world had seen 
and provided secure passage for merchants across a Mongol confederation of 
khanates, with the Great Khan as nominal ruler over all. Khubilai Khan himself had 
been elected Great Khan in 1260, though by this generation rivalry and dissension 
began to emerge among the Mongol nobility. His cousin Khaidu staged a revolt in 
1268 and took over control of the Central Asian Khanate of Changhadai. However, he 
was unable to secure the Mongolian homeland that was part of this khanate (Cohen 
2000: 146-7; Reischauer and Fairbank 1970: 273). Khubilai would not let go of 
Mongolia, the source and centre of the Mongol empire. Moreover, he sought further 
conquests in Asia to reinvigorate his empire, and sought religious affirmation of his 
imperial prowess. In this regard, Hall (1981: 86) records that Khubilai underwent two 
dedication ceremonies as a Jina-Buddha, one in 1264 and another in 1269, which he 
suggests "signalized his adoption of a programme of further Mongol conquests" 
(ibid.). Reischauer and Fairbank (1970: 278) note that he was also declared by the 
Buddhist clergy a cakravartin - a universal emperor under the Buddhist ideal. It was 
only two years after the second consecration that he commenced the Yuan dynasty of 
China, even though it was still some years hence, in 1276, before he took the Southern 
Song capital of Hangzhou. Having done so, it was not long before a number of 
archipelagic tributary states, including Pelambang in 1277, Jambu-Malaya in 1281, 
and Samudra-Pasai in 1282 (Hall 1992: 217) sent envoys to the new emperor to 
continue trading privileges with China. 
 
However, not all the old tributaries of imperial China chose to recognise "the Mongol 
upstarts" (SarDesai 1994:48). Those that refused were to be coerced into submission, 
a situation that would entail "a Mongol governor, taxes, and military corvee" (Reid 
1996: 17). Khubilai Khan's forces were ultimately unable to achieve these ends but his 
disruptions did cause a redrawing of the geostrategic map, with populations fleeing 
from the independent kingdom of Nanzhou (today's Yunnan in southwestern China) 
to the upper Mekong, establishing a capital at Chiengmai. Ayutthaya grew at the 
expense of Angkor. Pagan lost its unity. The Malay peninsula came under Thai 
influence. Nonetheless, at the time, the new Chinese emperor was determined to gain 
the allegiance of rebel Southeast Asian states, particularly the strategically vital region 
of the Melaka Straits. To this end, a punitive expedition of 20,000 attacked Java in 
1293. But despite their military cedentials, the Mongols ultimately lost to an 
ambitious and manipulative Javanese, Raden Vijaya. How could this occur?  
 
Java's Strategic Defeat of the Mongols. 
On the part of the Mongols, internal rivalries and external resistance, eroded Khubilai 
Khan's reputation. He encountered repeated resistance from the Japanese, who were 
assisted by storms that destroyed the approaching Mongol ships. Tropical Southeast 
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Asia, too, confronted the Mongols with determined resistance - often in the form of 
guerilla warfare (which was employed to good effect in more recent times) - and an 
alien climate in which the Mongol troops fared badly (Cohen 2000: 145). Domestic 
politics, be it his own or that of his intended vassal state, ultimately proved more 
treacherous than the menace of armies or nature.  
 
The domestic politics of Java concerns two key characters, the last King of Singosari, 
Kertanagara, and his son-in-law, Raden Vijaya, the first king of Majapahit. 
Kertanagara, who came to the throne in 1268, was a trantic practitioner of the Siva-
Buddha cult, who sought spiritual unification of his kingdom. He did this through 
enhancing his divinity via a consecration ceremony (as had Khubilai Khan, see above) 
in 1275 to make him a Buddha-Bhairava (Hall 1981: 84). Why, one may ask, did his 
kingdom need spiritual unification? There appear to be two reasons: divisions of the 
past and an impeding danger in the future. As to the first, it concerned a perceived 
"curse of division". As Hall (1981: 83-84) explains: 
 
Kertanagara believed that in order to defeat the centrifugal tendencies in Java he must 
combat the curse of division and strife laid upon the country by the action of the ascetic 
Bharada, who was believed to have carried out the partition of Airlangga's kingdom 
[Airlangga, reigned 1019-42, Java, son of a Balinese king and a Javanese princess]. 
Hence he erected his own statue in the guise of Aksobhya, a meditative Buddha on the 
spot where Bharada lived. 
 
The second reason to seek Java's spiritual unification was the need to prepare to resist 
an impeding war with an expansionist China. Emperor Khubilai Khan's forces had 
fought Nanchao, Pagan, Champa and Annam, though with little success in the case of 
Champa and Annam. Kertanagara's unification policy also entailed expansion. A large 
and unified kingdom was probably viewed necessary to meet the advancing Mongol 
threat. This meant the inclusion of, at least, Madura and Bali, and possibly the west 
coast of Borneo and the Malay peninsula (Hall 1981: 89). How this was done - by 
winning them over with his spiritual prowess into a 'holy alliance' or by military 
means - is not clear from the sources (see FitzGerald 1993: 84; Hall 1981: 86-88). 
Kertanegara's preparations and knowledge of the Mongol defeats (via his contacts 
with the ruler of Champa) must have emboldened him sufficiently to refuse the 
Mongol request for Java's submission. Moreover, he sent the Mongol delegation back 
to the Emperor of China (Khubilai Khan) with either a literal or a figurative 'loss of 
face' (Hall 1981: 88; FitzGerald 1993: 84). According to the Yuan dynasty records, 
Khubilai Khan told his military commanders (Groeneveldt 1960:22): 
 
When you arrive at Java you must clearly proclaim to the army and the people of that 
country, that the imperial Government has formerly had intercourse with Java by 
envoys from both sides and has been in good harmony with it, but that they have lately 
cut the face of the imperial envoy Meng Ch'i [and a number of subordinate officers 
who are named] and that you have come to punish them for that. 
 
Khubilai Khan sent a reprisal force of a thousand ships and 20,000 men to Java in 
1293. However, in the previous year rebellious vassals, under the leadership of  Prince 
Jayakatwang of Kadiri, took advantage of Kertanegara's spiritual unification mission 
abroad to topple the Singasari dynasty. Kertanegara was killed in his capital in 1292 
by Jayakatwang. Kertanegara's son-in-law, Crown Prince Raden Vijara, who began 
construction of a new capital (and what was to be a new dynasty), which he called 
Rosita Dellios  Sino-Indonesian Relations: Lessons from the Past 
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Majapahit, persuaded the Mongol expedition to support him as the new king by 
helping him to defeat Jayakatwang. In return he promised to submit to Khubilai Khan. 
When he succeeded in his objective, with the help of the Mongols, he turned upon 
them and forced them to retreat from Java. After defeating the Mongols, the new king, 
Vijaya, made peace with them and resumed trade with China.  
 
It may be concluded that while Vijaya outsmarted the Mongols and removed them 
from Java's political scene, their intervention did rescue much of Kertanagara's 
unification work, and allowed the new empire of Majapahit (1293- 1528) to rule over 
the archipelago. Hall (1992: 179) attributes to Kertanagara the first evidence of "the 
idea of a great archipelagic empire ruled by Javanese, which came to be expressed in 
the term nusantara". SarDesai (1994: 46) regards 1290 as a crucial year for the 
realisation of this idea as this was when Kertanagara absorbed the rival kingdom of 
Srivijaya and thus controlled both the Melaka and Sunda Straits. Raden Vijaya, who 
became known as Kertarajasa, thereby rescued through strategic cunning the 
nusantara project, so that for the next century, Majapahit formed a huge 'mandala'3
It may be added here that the cultural brokers operated from both sides. Just as 
notable Javanese envoys of Chinese origin, such as Chen Yen-xiang and Ma Yong-
 
state over most of island and peninsular Southeast Asia. The maintenance of the 
empire fell to yet another player in Java's historical ascent, the Chief Minister Gaja 
Mada. It was only after his death in 1364 that Majapahit began to decline, especially 
under the pressure of a Javanese Muslim coalition controlling the northern ports 
(Barwise and White 2002: 70; ). Majapahit finally succumbing in 1528 when the royal 
family fled to Bali, the last enclave of Hinduism in Indonesia.  
 
The Mongols, as representatives of China, not only inadvertently fostered a vast 
Javanese empire by their intervention on the Crown Prince's behalf, but also left 
behind three significant advantages for the great trading kingdom: shipbuiding 
technology that produced the large 500-600 tonne 'junks' (from the Javanese 'jong') 
cargo vessels; Chinese coinage that became the unified currency of trade in the 
archipelago (see Lach and Van Kley 1993: 1350); and a population of Chinese who 
intermarried and hence produced Sino-Indonesian communities (see Reid 1996: 17-
21). These engaged in commerce and proved to be suitable as envoys to the Chinese 
capital. 
 
 
III The 'Cultural Brokers' from the 14th Century Onwards 
 
Thus from the 14th century, diplomatic and trade interactions were fostered by what 
Reid (1996; 28; 2000: 65) terms 'cultural brokers' to refer to those Chinese who had 
settled in Southeast Asia and then become the local envoys to the Middle kingdom, 
much as they still do today, especially in trade and investment. Reid (1996: 27) cites a 
study of Chinese imperial records that indicates half of Java's envoys to China in the 
15th century bore Chinese names. That many of the emissaries with Chinese names 
also had "Southeast Asian personal names and titles" indicates, as Reid (ibid.) puts it, 
"a process of localisation was underway". 
 
                                                          
3  This is the Sanskrit word that was used in Hindu-Buddhist Indonesia to refer to kingdoms. It connotes 
the idea of an exemplary centre and a periphery loyal vassal states. (See Miksic 1996: 57; Dellios 
2003.) 
 10 
liang (Reid 1996: 29; 2000: 65-66), conducted diplomacy with China, Muslim 
Chinese, such as the celebrated Ming Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) and Ma Huan 
(Reid 2000: 66), enhanced China's diplomatic presence in the Archipelago in the 15th 
century. Between 1405 and 1433, Zheng He led seven imperial expeditions into 
Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, visited 40 states and enrolled 35 of them as 
tributaries (see Pan 1990: 3-4; Suarez 1999: 48; and Menzies 2002). He came to 
Semarang, Central Java in 1406 with a fleet of 62 vessels and 28,000 sailors. A 
temple, Gedung Batu, has been built on the site where he is said to have meditated for 
the night after stepping ashore. According to an article in Tempo (2003), Zheng He is 
revered not only by the Chinese, but by the wider community: 
 
Since Cheng Ho helped carry Islam to Java, and the construction of Gedung Batu 
commemorates the faith's arrival here, this temple has become a rare 'double sanctuary' 
that incorporates Javanese mysticism, social mores as well as interfaith belief system. 
 
This makes the premises sacred to Taoists [Daoists], Buddhists and Muslims alike. The 
sight of Indonesians wearing the peci (traditional cap) in the temple's interior, carrying 
incense sticks, praying in a Chinese klenteng (temple) to a Chinese admiral, gives one 
hope that these two races will one day live in harmony. 
 
Islam, like Buddhism, had established itself in the trading ports of both Southeast Asia 
and China via Middle Eastern traders, most notably Yemeni, who even before their 
conversion to Islam, traded with India, Southeast Asia, and thence to China where 
evidence of a Muslim presence dates from the early 8th century. 
 
Cultural brokerage would therefore benefit from familiarity with the two world 
religions, Buddhism and Islam, that helped to expand local horizons to a vast network 
of trading ports and pilgrimage sites. Muslims also travelled overland to China, as had 
the Buddhists before them, thereby adding a continental depth to the maritime reach of 
the region which coloured Sino-Indonesia relations. To be a cultural broker in the 
relatively cosmopolitan period of 'classical'4
                                                          
4  There is no standard periodisation and terminology to designate pre-colonial Southeast Asia. 
However, many have designated it 'classical'. Osborne (2000: 16) employs 'classical' as "a useful but 
highly qualified historical metaphor" suggestive of the "greatness of Greece and Rome". The term 
'classical' thus employed highlights the existence of a high culture in Southeast Asia, and not only in the 
better known civilisational centres of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, China and India. Gesick 
(1983: 7) justifies the use of 'classical' as a term of convenience "to denote a recognizable genus of 
Southeast Asian polities". Barwise and White (2002) regard 'early' Southeast Asia as covering the 
period of prehistory to c. 500 CE; its 'classical' phase as 500-1500; 'early modern' occurs 1500-1800; 
and 'colonial' from 1800 to 1941. Miksic (1996) provides a chronological chart which periodicises 
Southeast Asian history according to the following periods and approximate dates: early prehistory, 
2,000,000 - 10,000 BCE; late prehistory, 10,000 BCE - 200 CE; protohistory, 200 - 600 CE; early 
classic, 600 - 900 CE; middle classic, 900 - 1250 CE; late classic, 1250-1500 CE; and early Islam, 
1500-1600 CE. Some scholars prefer to call the classical period 'early' Southeast Asia (Tarling 2001), 
'earlier' Southeast Asia (Wolters 1999), and 'early modern' (Reid 2000). 
 Southeast Asia would have been a well 
suited occupation of the times, as it is also in the present era when economic 
globalisation has created a demand for transcultural competencies. Such was the 
transformative role of political and trade relations within eastern Asia that notions of 
identity were highly contingent. As Reid (1996: 21) notes of the first half of the 15th 
century: "The categories 'Chinese', 'Javanese', and 'Muslim' should not be seen as 
mutually exclusive at a time when links with the Chinese and Islamic heartlands were 
tenuous in the extreme." Moreover, ". . . the label 'Chinese' was no more clear-cut than 
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the label 'Javanese', as indicated in the use of 'Tartar' or 'Mongol' in the earliest 
Javanese references to them" (Reid 2000: 68-69). Just how unclear the label 'Javanese' 
was may be gleaned from its application to "people of the pasisir [trading] ports - 
Muslim, commercially oriented, and multi-ethnic in origin" (Reid 2000: 72). 
 
A sense of difference may be found between the merchant class and nobility, rather 
than being Chinese or Javanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Muslim. Indeed, the Javanese 
nobility claimed Chinese ancestry (as reported by Portuguese and Spanish writers of 
the time, see Lach and Van Kley 1993: 1301; Reid 2000: 73); and both the Chinese 
and Indonesians appeared, at one time, to link themselves to Alexander the Great, 
thereby broadening the scope of their ancestral prestige. The following excerpt from 
The Malay Annals (Leyden 2001: 173-4) is illustrative:   
 
This letter is dispatched from beneath the sandals of the feet of the King of Heaven [the 
Chinese emperor], to be placed above the diadem of the Raja of Malaca [sic]. "Verily we 
have heard that the Raja of Malaca is a great raja, for which reason we have desired his 
friendship and attachment, because we are also descended from Raja Secander [Iskandar] 
Zulkarneini, and of the same extraction as the Raja of Malaca. There is no raja in the 
universal world greater than me . . . 
 
One Acehnese ruler of the early 17th century was known as Iskandar Muda (1607-36). 
Also in Sumatra, the Minangkabau royal family claimed descent from Iskandar. Their 
official letters, Drakard (1999:154) observes, "sometimes carried three seals, 
representing the rulers of Minagkabau, China and Rum [Ottoman empire], all three of 
whom were said  to be descended from Iskandar Zulkarnain".5
Such universalism, premised on the view of the sacred origins of kingship and the 
political prestige this entailed, came apart under the racially divisive policies of the 
European colonial powers. There is an instance of a court case in Cirebon, Java, in the 
late 17th century, which held two forms of identification of an accused murderer. One 
was the local Cirebonese identification of him by his title, Ki Aria Marta Ningrat (no 
personal name was given), indicating he was a high official. The Dutch (VOC), by 
comparison, identified him in their records as 'Chinees' (Chinese). According to 
Anderson (1991: 167), who draws attention to this court case: "It is clear that the 
Cirebonese court classified people by rank and status, while the Company [VOC] did 
so by something like race."  Reid (2000: 81) regards such distinctions as an indication 
of "a new separation of functions. Commerce became identified as the sphere of 
culturally distinct Chinese . . . making it easier for Javanese and Dutch rulers jointly 
to suppress the 'Javanese' commercial dynamism of the pasisir". In this new period, 
marked by colonial rule, Sino-Indonesian 'cultural brokers' could no longer represent 
the Javanese court to the Chinese emperor. Rather, they became the intermediaries 
between the Europeans and the local communities in many respects - including the 
unpopular occupation of tax collecting (Fernando and Bulbeck 1992: 2) This 
transition from the respectable profession of diplomacy, in which localised Chinese 
carried the honoured titles of 'patih' and 'arya' as representives of the Javanese tribute 
 These letters were 
regarded as part of Sumatran domestic politics in that they glorified the ruler and 
provided "grants of authority" to local officials (ibid.: 155). 
 
                                                          
5 Iskandar Zulkarnain means 'Alexander the two-horned one'. This refers to the story of his deification 
through the Egyptian god Ammon, whose temple Alexander visited for oracular advice. Alexander is 
depicted with two horns on coins which were widely used as currency for trade in the Middle East and 
Asia, as were the Chinese coins noted above. 
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missions to Ming China (see Reid 2000: 65, 82; 1996: 27-28), to intra-regional traders 
during Ming isolationism,6
IV Suharto's Ancestral Habits   
 to one of reviled colonial intermediary, set the scene for 
anti-Chinese sentiment in modern Indonesia.  
 
Under the structure of colonial rule, the Chinese become a source of envy and 
hostility, not only in Indonesia but throughout Southeast Asia. As Hsien Rin (1982: 
145) elaborates: 
 
The colonial societies of Southeast Asia were characterized by ethnic pluralism. An 
overseas Chinese society was an economic and social layer between the dominant 
imperialist white society and the native societies. The Chinese became mediators between 
the two other cultural groups which co-existed, but lacked any real communication. In this 
way the status of the Chinese as an intermediate group of traders became firmly 
established, and they soon controlled national economies. Such gains greatly encouraged 
the Chinese to maintain their own cultural identity. In doing so, however, they could not 
avoid racial and economic conflicts with native societies with which they, too, lacked 
communication. These conflicts did not become overt until the period before World War 
II, when the white strata put more emphasis on the three-tiered social structure for their 
own purposes of control.  
 
Today ethnic Chinese form the merchant class in Southeast Asian countries, creating a 
network of Asian (and often global) business. Many are investing directly back into 
the Chinese economy, thereby contributing to an economic Greater China. Most of 
China's direct foreign investment comes from overseas Chinese. Such a vast and 
wealthy network might even be regarded as an echo of former times of Chinese 
grandeur when the tribute-trade system prevailed. That the Chinese diaspora are still 
treated, in some parts of Southeast Asia, as a ‘scapegoat’ in times of economic trouble 
was demonstrated during the Indonesian crisis which culminated in May 1998 with 
rioting and destruction of Sino-Chinese lives and property. Ethnic Chinese have also 
served as the meat in the proverbial sandwich at a time of major political transition in 
modern Indonesia. This occurred in 1965 when the New Order regime of President 
Suhato was launched after an abortive coup. 
 
 
 
Indonesia's experience of European colonialism was protracted (from the 17th 
century) and indirect, as the Dutch preferred to use local rulers to implement their 
policies. This meant that Indonesia reached independence in 1949 as modern state 
with traditional power structures still in place. The result was that after 17 
governments in 12 years, efforts at constitutional democracy were abandoned in 
favour of what became known as 'Guided Democracy' - in effect, the charismatic 
leadership politics of Sukarno. As he became increasingly embroiled in political 
faction-fighting, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) steadily grew in power, and 
the Army - which saw itself as the guardian of Indonesia's hard-won independence - 
became alarmed (see Osborne 2000: 190-1; Sukma 1999: 45-46). Thus three key 
political forces were in triangular play (Elsen 2001: 88-89; Sukma 1999: 29): Sukarno 
                                                          
6 With the passing of China's naval supremacy and the onset of Ming isolationism in the latter 15th and 
16th centuries, private traders increasingly took over Chinese commercial expansion into Southeast 
Asia. This was often a dangerous task for the state did not support such private enterprise. Indeed it had 
outlawed all private overseas trade until 1567 when a system of licensed private trade was introduced. 
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himself at the apex of the triangle, with the Army and the PKI as oppositional forces 
which he sought to control. In reality, one (the PKI) gained more from his radicalism 
than the other (the Army) which felt increasingly threatened by it. The parliament and 
the cabinet were by now, under 'Guided Democracy', marginalised from the political 
contest (Elson 2001: 89).  
 
All three players were well armed with their charismatic power. Sukarno was a 
traditional 'man of prowess',7
                                                          
7  On the use of this term, see Wolters 1999; Dellios 2003. 
 who was seen have a surfeit of spiritual power enabling 
him to command the masses. To this end, he engaged in theatrical politics, 
communicating by slogans and symbols, and presenting himself as a heroic ruler in a 
world of deceit. However, this also revealed a problem he had, one which went 
against Indonesian political culture. To quote Pye (1985: 114): 
 
Sukarno repeatedly set impossible goals for Indonesia and then found that he had been 
confounded by conspiracies. His behavior would have been more consistent with 
Javanese norms if he had set modest objectives and then been lavish in extolling his 
good fortune in achieving them. 
 
The Army's charismatic power came from its heroic struggle against the Dutch, 
eulogised  in the subsequent nation-building effort of such a vast and diverse country. 
Indeed, the Army's cohesion was seen as a fortifying element in a fragile political 
construct, as well as its power to enforce politics. One potential weakness of the Army 
was its ideological disposition (as guardians of the revolutionary struggle for 
independence), and hence its capacity to not only enforce, but define politics. In other 
words, as Mao Zedong famously said in his Little Red Book, "political power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun". Less well know is his subsequent statement: "The Party 
must control the gun, and the gun must not be allowed to control the Party." Like 
China's dual purpose civil-military armed forces, Indonesia's 'dwifungsi' armed forces 
functioned in this expanded manner of political guardian. It is a potential weakness in 
that it can militarise politics, so that the gun controls the party and the people. The 
Army's drive to be involved in politics was accompanied by a second weakness, an 
increasing desire by those in its upper echelons to engage in business. 
 
The Indonesian Communist Party exploited this weakness with its criticisms of 
'bureaucratic capitalists', which was directed at the Army (Elson 2001: 95). The PKI 
thus also benefited from the charisma of a radical ideology by championing left-wing 
causes. Moreover, it tapped into Sukarno's anti-Western rhetoric, even though he was 
a major political force to contend with. However, the PKI 's appeal to "revolutionary 
fervour", as if it hoped to come to power "by acclamation", was counteracted by the 
reality of its minimal representation in cabinet and the Army's coercive power (ibid.: 
89). Despite its lack of a firm political and military support base, the PKI was  thought 
to have instigated, along with China's support (which Sukarno cultivated), the 
infamous coup d'etat of 1965. This caused the Army - as 'guardians' - to step in.  
 
From the middle of October 1965 throughout the first half of 1966, a series of 
acts of 'popular revenge' against the communists were launched by local army 
commanders, Muslim and other youth groups, and by village 'volunteer guards'. 
(Sukma 1999: 48-49) 
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By conservative estimates, 250,000 people were killed. Many were ethnic Chinese. 
President Sukarno empowered General Suharto to restore order; the PKI was declared 
illegal. In 1967, Sukarno's Old Order was replaced by Suharto's New Order 
bureaucratic politics. The military propped up Suharto's system, and the whole 
enterprise was run according to the traditional patron-client relationships well known 
to Indonesians. He also competed with Sukarno as a 'man of prowess', ignoring his 
predecessor as the proclaimer of independence and formulator of the national ideology 
of Pancasila (Schreiner 2002: 200). Suharto even chose different national heroes to 
those of Sukarno: Suharto's were more representative of the regional diversity of 
Indonesia, compared to Sukarno's stronger Java bias (Schreiner 2002: 186-7). 
Sukarno's place in Indonesian history was left ambivalent. Suharto, by comparison, 
strode upon the stage of stability and development. Everything that Sukarno was, 
Suharto was not. If anything, Suharto's avoidance of emotionalism played to Javanese 
notions of spiritual power. Again quoting Pye (1985: 114-5): 
 
[Sukarno's] sense of drama did help unite the country, but his excessive display of 
emotion violated the Javanese notion that true power is a subtle matter, and that the real 
leader should be one who can maintain a balance between his inner emotions and his 
formalistic and almost ritual-like moves. 
 
Above all, Sukarno's radical Chinese connections in the form of a Jakarta-Peking axis 
and his domestic revolutionary rhetoric that fuelled the PKI, became the brunt of 
Suharto's policies. Sukma (1999: Ch. 3) regards the China-PKI-ethnic Chinese linkage 
as the threat base upon which Suharto was able to justify - and hence maintain - his 
New Order. Without China his regime was virtually baseless. In this, China-Indonesia 
relations appear to be both symbiotic and reflective of the past. China under the 
Mongols attacked Java in 1293, but ultimately lost to an ambitious and manipulative 
Javanese, Raden Vijaya. More recently, Marxist-inspired China found common anti-
imperialist cause with independent Indonesia. It was also when the Middle Kingdom 
came under the sway of a foreign ideology, Soviet-inspired Communism, that 
relations with Jakarta found a common anti-imperialist cause. Yet this axis of 
understanding also served the machinations of Javanese politics and the rise to power 
of a Javanese general, Suharto.  
 
Ironically, China - not Indonesia - is celebrated today as a strategic culture of 
deception, as popularised by the writings attributed to the classical military strategist, 
Sun Tzu or Master Sun. Yet in early Sino-'Indonesian' relations it met Java as an 
invader who was defeated through another master dalang (puppeteer) of deception 
(Raden Vijaya), and in more recent history as an ideologue of struggle, a posture at 
odds with the traditional Chinese emphasis on Confucian and Daoist harmony. As to 
the modern-day dalang, former president Suharto, his anti-Communist (and hence 
anti-China) cause lent legitimacy to a regime of reward and punishment. It was one 
which mirrored both its Maoist opponent in Peking, as well as China's legalists and 
militarists of an earlier age. In both these historical illustrations of Sino-Indonesian 
encounters, China is represented by a foreign dynasty or ideology, and Indonesia is 
played out by a master manipulator and, ultimately, usurper.  
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Conclusion 
 
A perennial geopolitical concern of large nations is that of fragmentation and 
integration. A safeguard may well be found in the yet larger unit of the region within 
which creative and productive energies may be deployed. In the past this was 
demonstrated during the period of the pilgrimages, 5th - 8th centuries, when religious 
values, a free flow of trade, and committed leaders appeared to be the three 
characteristics of worth. It remains to be seen whether the current nascent regionalism 
of eastern Asia - especially between the two giants, China and Indonesia - produce a 
similar harmony of intent despite an absence of a unified religious community. The 
secular state system is unlikely to yield readily to such a concept, though it is 
becoming accustomed to an emerging international civil society of government and 
non-government organisations. 
 
Interestingly, a Muslim community or 'ummah' has been identified as the aspiration of 
Islamic militants for Southeast Asia. Thus while religion may be regarded positively 
as a belief system that unites populations and that has universalist appeal, it also has 
its territorial counterpart that lends itself to exclusionary claims. As political 
geographer Muir (1997: 23) points out, the ummah is "the place where Muslims live" 
running from "Morocco and Mauretania to Malaysia and Indonesia". In Islam there 
are also the related notions of a zone of peace, 'Dar al Islam', and its counterpart, 'Dar 
al Hub', a zone of potential violence populated by non-believers (see Sivan 1998). 
This suggests that despite the Qu'ran supporting democractic ideas, human rights and 
equality,8 like other religiously-based communities, its ideological misuse is 
conceivable. This has happened in the Middle East, South Asia and Sri Lanka, 
Northern Ireland and the Balkans. It may happen in eastern Asia, though the two 
countries with the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia and China, do not exhibit the 
political culture within which it can become imbedded. Moreover, both countries 
reflect a syncretic capacity culturally and a statist centralism politically.9
While culturally different, Indonesia and China appear to have more in common than 
meets popular perception. They are large multi-ethnic nations attempting to maintain 
their unity in the face of centrifugal forces. Globalisation in the present era has also 
made regional relations even more imperative for maintaining national strength. 
Internal stability appears to be best served by regional integration on the basis of 
common cultural, commercial and national interests. It is also more ably expressed in 
an ethic of respect that prevailed in past periods, not only between nations but also 
between peoples. Unless internal divisions are healed, or at least better managed, 
external relations are unlikely to escape the manipulative forces of domestic politics. 
In an age which has seen the rise of militant Islam, and along with it, an increasingly 
 It is unlikely 
they would share power with any competing religious interest, as China's outlawing of 
Falun Gong has demonstrated. 
 
                                                          
8  As Carey (2003: 15) points out, the precepts of democracy are supported by concepts of community 
(ummah), consultation (shura) and consensus (ijma); human rights by the right to life (Qu'ran 6: 151), 
right to a basic living standard (15: 19), the right to freedom (9: 60), and the right to justice (4: 135); 
and equality through the Qu'ran's assertion (4: 1; 49: 13) that all human beings are equal. 
9 In the post-Suharto period there has been a new decentralisation to district/local levels. This does not, 
however, detract from a unitary Indonesian state as the overriding reality. 
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imperialistic USA, the two largest polities in eastern Asia would do well to heed their 
history. 
Rosita Dellios  Sino-Indonesian Relations: Lessons from the Past 
 17 
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, Benedict (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso. 
 
Aron, Tim (1999) 'Assessing Systems for Advancing Peace, Prosperity and Civilization', 
Periscope, Vol. 2, No. 1, at http://www2.iuj.ac.jp/periscope/paperV21.htm 
 
Barwise, J. M. and N. J. White (2002) A Traveller's History of South East Asia, London: 
Windrush Press in assoc. with Cassell & Co. 
 
Borthwick, Mark (1992) Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin. 
 
Carey, Dawn (2003) 'The Cosmopolitan Epoch: Configuring a Just World Order', The Culture 
Mandala, Vol. 6, No. 1, December, at www.international-relations.com 
 
Cohen, Warren I. (2000) East Asia at the Centre: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with 
the World, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Cotterell, Arthur (1993) 'The Unification of China', in Arthur Cotterell (ed.) The Penguin 
Encyclopedia of Classical Civilizations, London: Penguin, pp. 237-282. 
 
De Casparis, I. G. and I. W. Mabbett (1992) 'Religion and Popular Beliefs of Southeast Asia 
before c. 1500', in Nicholas Tarling (ed.) The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 276-339. 
 
Dellios, Rosita (2003) Mandala: From Sacred Origins to Sovereign Affairs, Research Paper 
No. 10, Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Bond University, at 
www.international-relations.com 
 
Drakard, Jane (1999) A Kingdom of Words: Language and Power in Sumatra, Shah Alam, 
Malaysia: Oxford University Press.  
 
Elson, R. E. (2001) Suharto: A Political Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fa Hsien (Fa Xian) (1986) A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms, trans. James Legge, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Fernando, M. R. and David Bulbeck (eds) (1992) Chinese Economic Activity in 
Netherlands India, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies  
 
FitzGerald, C. P. (1993, reprint) The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People, Bangkok: 
White Lotus. 
 
Gesick, Lorraine (1983) 'Introduction', in Lorraine Gesick (ed.) Centres, Symbols, and 
Hierarchies: Essays on the Classical States of Southeast Asia, Monograph No. 26, New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, pp. 1-8. 
 
Groeneveldt, W. P. (1960) Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya Compiled from 
Chinese Sources (1880), C. V. Bhratara: Jakarta. 
 
Hall, D. G. E. (1981) A History of South-East Asia, 4th edn, London: Macmillan. 
 
 18 
Hall, Kenneth R. (1992) 'Economic History of Early Southeast Asia', in Nicholas Tarling (ed.) 
The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 183-275. 
 
Hsien Rin (1982), 'The Synthesizing Mind in Chinese Ethno-Cultural Adjustment', in George 
De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross (eds) Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2003) The Military Balance 2003-2004, 
Oxford: Oxford university Press. 
 
Lach, Donalf F. and Edwin J. Van Kley (1993) Asia in the Making of Europe, Vol. III, 
Book 3, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Leyden, John, trans. (2001) The Malay Annals, Selangor, Malaysia: The Malaysian Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, MBRAS Reprint 20. 
 
McCawley, Tom (2003) 'Indonesia in Transition', Asia Today International, Vol. 21, No. 5, 
October-November, pp. 51-52. 
 
Menzies, Gavin (2002) 1421: The Year China Discovered the World, Bantam Press, New 
York. 
 
Miksic, John (vol. ed.) (1996) Ancient History: Indonesian Heritage, Singapore: Archipelago 
Press. 
 
Muir, Richard (1997) Political Geography: A New Introduction, Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
 
Osborne, Milton (2000) Southeast Asia: An Illustrated Introductory History, 8th edn, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin. 
 
Pan, Lynn (1990) Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora, Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co.  
 
Percell, Victor  (1965) The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pye, Lucian W. (1885) Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
 
Rahula, Walpola (1978) What the Buddha Taught, 3rd edn, London: Gordon Fraser. 
 
Reid, Anthony (1996) 'Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with 
Southeast Asia', in Anthony Reid (ed.) Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia 
and the Chinese, St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, pp. 15- 50. 
 
 __________ (2000) Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Reischauer, Edwin O. and John K. Fairbank (1970) East Asia: The Great Tradition, 
8th printing, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 
 
SarDesai, D. R. (1994) Southeast Asia: Past and Present, 3rd edn, Boulder, Colorado: 
Westrview Press. 
 
Rosita Dellios  Sino-Indonesian Relations: Lessons from the Past 
 19 
Schreiner, Klaus H.  (2002) 'National Ancestors': The Ritual Construction of Nationhood', in 
Henri Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid The Potent Dead: Ancestors, Saints and Heroes in 
Contemporary Indonesia, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 
 
Sivan, Emmanuel (1998) 'The Holy War Tradition in Islam', Orbis, Vol. 42, No. 2, 
Spring. 
 
Slamet-Velsink, Ina E. (1995) Emerging Hierarchies: Processes of Stratification and Early 
State Formation in the Indonesian Archipelago: Prehistory and the Ethnographic Present, 
Leiden: KITLV Press. 
 
Snow, Donald M. (2003) Cases in International Relations: Portraits of the Future, NY: 
Longman. 
 
Suarez, Thomas (1999) Early Mapping of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong: Periplus. 
 
Sukma, Rizal (1999) Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Tarling, Nicholas (2001) Southeast Asia: A Modern History, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Tempo (2003),'Gedung Batu: Home of Java's Most popular Folk Deity', 1 September. 
 
Wang Gungwu (1992) Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia, St 
Leonards, NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin.  
 
Wolters, O. W. (1967) Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Srivijaya, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
__________ (1999) History, Culture and Religion in Southeast Asian Perspectives, Revised 
edn, Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications (SEAP), Southeast Asia Program, 
Cornell University, in cooperation with The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 
Singapore. 
 
 
 
 
